osTicket Attacks
π― Objective: Exploit osTicket support system for information disclosure and credential harvesting through ticket data access and social engineering vectors.
Overview
osTicket is an open-source PHP-based support ticketing system with MySQL backend. Often exposed externally, it can provide valuable intelligence including user credentials, email addresses, and internal system information through ticket conversations.
HTB Academy Lab Solution
Lab: Credential Extraction from Support Tickets
Question: "Find your way into the osTicket instance and submit the password sent from the Customer Support Agent to the customer Charles Smithson."
Target: support.inlanefreight.local (add to /etc/hosts)
Step 1: Setup vHost Resolution
# Add target to hosts file
echo "10.129.201.88 support.inlanefreight.local" >> /etc/hostsStep 2: Access osTicket Interface
# Navigate to: http://support.inlanefreight.local/scp/login.php
# osTicket login page (staff control panel)Step 3: Credential Testing
Based on discovered credentials from OSINT/data breaches:
Email:
kevin@inlanefreight.localPassword:
Fish1ng_s3ason!
# Login to osTicket staff panel with kevin's credentials
# URL: http://support.inlanefreight.local/scp/login.phpStep 4: Ticket Investigation
Access ticket queue (may show no open tickets)
Check closed tickets for sensitive information
Look for Charles Smithson ticket conversation
Review agent-customer communication
Step 5: Password Extraction
In the ticket conversation between:
Customer: Charles Smithson (VPN lockout issue)
Agent: Kevin Grimes (password reset)
Extracted Password: Found in agent's message to customer
Answer: [PASSWORD_FROM_TICKET] (extract from actual ticket content)
Attack Vectors
1. Information Disclosure
Email harvesting from address books
Credential exposure in ticket conversations
Internal system details from support communications
Employee names/usernames for OSINT
2. Email Address Generation
Create support ticket β get temporary company email
Use for service registration (Slack, GitLab, etc.)
Email verification bypass via ticket system access
3. Social Engineering
Staff impersonation through ticket system knowledge
Standard password discovery (new joiner passwords)
Password spraying targets from user lists
Common Findings
Sensitive Data in Tickets:
π Default/temporary passwords
π§ Email addresses and usernames
π’ Internal system information
π Password reset procedures
π₯ Staff contact details
Attack Chain Example:
OSINT β Find leaked credentials
Access osTicket β Staff panel login
Ticket mining β Extract passwords/info
Lateral movement β VPN/other services
Password spraying β Standard passwords
Key Techniques
Credential Sources:
Data breach dumps (DeHashed, etc.)
Password reuse across services
Default credentials testing
Reconnaissance:
Subdomain enumeration for support portals
Staff email identification
Service discovery for attack vectors
π‘ Pro Tip: Support systems often contain the most sensitive internal communications - always check closed tickets for credential leakage and password reset conversations.
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